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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
SAMUEL A. LEVY, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Appeal No. 990777-CA 
) Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from Mr. Levy's conviction for the offense of Driving While 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs or with Unsafe Blood Alcohol 
Concentration in violation of Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 44 of the Municipal Code of 
Park City, Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee (hereafter referred to as "Park City") accepts the Statement of Issues and 
Standard of Review set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES OR RULES 
The following Rules and Statute are determinative or of central importance to the 
appeal: 
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1. Rule 4-404( 10) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration: 
Calling additional jurors. If there is an insufficient number of prospective jurors 
to fill all jury panels, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to summon from 
the qualified jury list such additional jurors as necessary. The clerk shall make 
every reasonable effort to contact the prospective jurors in the order listed on the 
qualified jury list. If after reasonable efforts the clerk fails to contact a juror, the 
clerk shall attempt to contact the next juror on the list. If the clerk is unable to 
obtain a sufficient number of jurors in a reasonable period of time, the court may 
use any lawful method for acquiring a jury. 
2. Rule 18(e)(4) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A 
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted or 
employed by ihe state or a political subdivision thereof; 
3. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (1999): 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two 
hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the person has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; 
4. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (1998) 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(ii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of. 08 grams or greater as 
shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation 
or physical control; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Levy is charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs or with Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration on February 6, 1999. Mr. Levy was 
2 
convicted at a jury trial on August 11, 1999. A Notice of Appeal was filed on September 
8, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Defendant Samuel A. Levy ("Mr. Levy") is charged in an Information filed by 
Park City Municipal Corporation with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol 
and/or Drugs or with Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration on February 6, 1999. (R. 15-
16). 
2. Defendant plead not guilty to the above charges and a jury trial was 
commenced on August 11, 1999. (R. 9, 11, 57). 
3. There were originally 20 prospective jurors on the Jury List to hear this case. 
However, as a result of jurors failing to appear or being excused from jury service before 
trial, 11 prospective jurors were initially seated. (R. 57, Tr. 130- Appendix 1). 
4. As a result of the voir dire examination, 3 of the 11 jurors were excused for 
cause leaving only eight prospective jurors on the jury panel. (R. 57, Tr. 130, Tr. 79, 
Lines 15-25 through Tr. 80, Lines 1-10- Appendix 1). 
5. With only eight prospective jurors remaining on the jury panel there was 
insufficient jurors to allow an eight-person jury after the exercise of three preemptory 
challenges by both the prosecution and defense. Defense counsel was unwilling to waive 
one preemptive challenge and the prosecution was unwilling to waive two preemptive 
challenges so the existing panel could be utilized. (Tr. 79, Lines 15-25 through Tr. 80, 
Lines 1-10). 
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6. Rather than call a mistrial, the trial judge instructed the bailiff to "go to the 
clerk's office, go to the sheriffs office, go over to the industrial building and you bring 
me four more jurors post haste." (Tr. 37, Lines 11-15). 
7. The bailiff returned with four additional prospective jurors, all of whom 
worked in the Summit County Justice Center: Jurors 12 and 13, Summit County Justice 
Court Clerks; Juror 14, a newly hired Summit County Dispatcher; and, Juror 15, a 
Summit County Deputy Sheriff. (Tr. 39, Line 16; Tr. 41, Line 12; Tr. 42, Lines 4-7; Tr. 
42, Lines 18-23). 
8. Juror 15, the Summit County Deputy Sheriff, was excused for cause having 
dealt with the arresting officer and prosecution witness in a professional setting and 
having formed an opinion as to his credibility. (Tr. 62, Lines 9-16; Tr. 63, Lines 11-14). 
9. The remaining additional jurors indicated they had not dealt with the arresting 
officer and prosecution witness before and did not have any opinions as to his 
creditability. (Tr. 61, Lines 9-25 through Tr. 62, Lines 1-8). 
10. The two Justice Court Clerks were acquainted with both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel because of their work in and around the Courthouse and were not 
socially involved with either attorney. (Tr. 43, Lines 15-25, Tr. 44, Lines 1-8). 
11. Juror 13, Summit County Dispatcher, was recently hired and did not know 
either counsel and did not dispatch for the Park City Police Department where the 
arresting officer and prosecution witness was employed. (Tr. 48, Lines 1-7, Tr. 61, Line 
23 through Tr. 62, Lines 1-4). 
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12. After the voir dire examination was completed, defense counsel challenged for 
cause Juror 7 and Jurors 12, 13 and 14 who were the additional jurors located by the 
bailiff. (Tr. 95, Lines 22-25). 
13. Defense counsel did not use his preemptory challenges on the additional jurors 
but instead used his preemptory challenges on Jurors 1, 4 and 8. (R. 57, Tr. 130-
Appendix 1). 
14. During the trial the prosecution objected to defendant's expert, Dennis 
Crouch, testifying as to the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving using 
extrapolation based on the number of drinks, timing of the drinks and the 
absorption/metabolic rate of alcohol. (Tr. 106, Lines 5-25). 
15.After reviewing Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) the trial court concluded 
that the "statute clearly says that the question's not what the breathalyzer test was at the 
time of the stop, but what a breathalyzer test was within two hours of the stop". The trial 
court sustained the prosecution's objection to admissibility of expert testimony regarding 
defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of stop based on the absorption and 
metabolism of alcohol. (Tr. 119, Lines 1-6; Tr. 127, Lines 1-6). 
16. At Mr. Levy's attorneys' request, the trial judge requested the jury to 
determine if Mr. Levy is guilty of both Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and 
Driving with a Blood Alcohol Content of .08 or greater. (Supp. Tr. 2, Lines 13-25 
through Supp. Tr. 3, Lines 1-8; Supp. Tr. 8, Lines 18-25 through Supp. Tr. 9, Lines 1-10). 
17. The jury found Mr. Levy guilty of both Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and Driving with a Blood Alcohol Content of .08 or greater by underlining both 
verdicts. (R. 38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial judge acted properly pursuant to Rule 4-404( 10) of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration when he directed the bailiff to locate additional jurors when the 
jury panel was reduced to a number insufficient to seat a four-person jury and allow each 
attorney to exercise three preemptory challenges. Any alleged improprieties were waived 
when Mr. Levy's attorney failed to exercise his preemptory challenges on the jurors 
unsuccessfully challenged for cause. 
2. The trial judge properly disallowed expert testimony on the absorptive and 
metabolic rate of alcohol based on Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i)(1999) which Mr. 
Levy's attorney represents is the applicable statute. Even if the 1998 statute governed, 
any error in disallowing the expert testimony was harmless because the jury found Mr. 
Levy guilty of both Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Driving with 
Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMPLIED WITH UTAH LAW REGARDING 
JURY SELECTION AND DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY. 
The procedure for jury selection, qualification and service is set forth in Rule 4-
404 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (1992). This Rule specifically provides 
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for the calling of additional jurors if there are an insufficient number of prospective jurors 
to fill the jury panel. Subsection (10) of said Rule provides: 
(10) Calling additional jurors. If there is an insufficient number of prospective 
jurors to fill all jury panels, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to summon 
from the qualified jury list such additional jurors as necessary. The clerk shall 
make every reasonable effort to contact the prospective jurors in the order listed 
on the qualified jury list. If after reasonable efforts the clerk fails to contact a 
juror, the clerk shall attempt to contact the next juror on the list. If the clerk is 
unable to obtain a sufficient number of jurors in a reasonable period of time, the 
court may use any lawful method for acquiring a jury. (Emphasis added). 
There were originally twenty prospective jurors on the Jury List to hear this case. 
(See Appendix 1). However, as a result of numerous prospective jurors failing to appear 
or being excused from jury service before trial, eleven prospective jurors were initially 
seated. Three jurors were excused for cause during the selection process. This left eight 
prospective jurors remaining and ten prospective jurors were needed if both counsel 
exercised their three preemptory challenges. Defense counsel refused to waive one of the 
defense's preemptory challenges and the prosecution refused to waive two preemptory 
challenges so the existing panel could be used. (Tr. 79 Lines 15-25 through Tr. 80 Lines 
1-10). Under the circumstances, the trial court had to locate additional jurors or continue 
the trial to a later date with another panel. To utilize the court date and not inconvenience 
additional jurors, witnesses and counsel, the trial judge directed the bailiff to find four 
additional prospective jurors from the immediate area. Appellant challenges the 
lawfulness of this procedure. 
In State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990) a challenge was made to the 
jury selection process when the trial court used jurors which had been excused from 
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another District Court trial earlier that same day on the basis said jurors were not 
"randomly drawn from the complete jury wheel". The statute in question, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-46-13(4), is the predecessor to Rule 4-404(10) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. This statute provides that if there is "an unanticipated shortage of 
available trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, the court may require the clerk of 
the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors selected at random by the court 
from the qualified jury wheel". The Utah Court of Appeals held the trial judge used 
proper discretion in utilizing the jurors excused from another case: 
Defendant argues that § 78-46-13(4) gives the trial court two options in the face of 
a shortage of jurors—to summon jurors from the complete jury wheel or to declare 
a mistrial. We disagree. Section 78-46-13(4) is couched in permissive terms and 
appears to give the court some discretion on how to make up a shortage of jurors. 
Although the court may direct the clerk of the court to summon jurors at random 
from the jury wheel, the statute does not require it to do so. 793 P.2d at 937 
.. .We hold that the trial court's decision to utilize unused jurors from other 
courtrooms did not amount to a substantial departure from § 78-46-13(4). The 
decision to utilize qualified, unused jurors who had been properly called to serve 
as jurors on that day was a sound exercise of the court's discretion; advanced the 
interest of judicial economy; and permitted the trial to proceed as scheduled 
without unnecessary delay to witnesses and counsel or disruption to the court's 
calendar. Having concluded the statute was substantially complied with, we need 
not consider the additional requirement under § 78-46-16(2) that 'substantial 
injustice and prejudice' resulted from the procedure employed by the court. 793 
P.2dat938 
The decision of the trial court in the case at bar to locate four additional 
prospective jurors was within the court's authority under Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration 4-404(10) which provides "the court may use any lawful method for 
acquiring a jury". This language provides more discretion to the trial judge than the 
former statute analyzed in Suarez. The trial court's decision to locate additional jurors 
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allowed the trial to proceed as scheduled without unduly delaying the witnesses and 
jurors or disrupting the court's calendar. 
Appellant argues the prospective jurors were all Summit County employees from 
the same building that houses the trial court and resulted in two Summit County Justice 
clerks, a Summit County dispatcher and a Summit County Deputy Sheriff being called as 
prospective jurors. Appellant cites Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 
18(e)(4)(1999) in support of his position that the additional jurors should have been 
removed from the jury panel for cause. This provision provides: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A 
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted or 
employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof: (Emphasis added). 
The Summit County Deputy Sheriff was excused for cause based on the foregoing 
Rule. However, the remaining additional jurors indicated they had not dealt with Officer 
Buchanan before and did not have any opinion as to his creditability. (Tr. 61,62). The 
two Justice Court clerks were acquainted with both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
because of their work in and around the Courthouse but were not socially involved with 
either attorney. (Tr. 43,44) Juror No. 13, the Summit County dispatcher, was recently 
hired and did not know either counsel and did not dispatch for the Park City Police 
Department. (Tr. 48,62) Under these circumstances, the trial court properly allowed the 
two Justice Court clerks and the Summit County dispatcher to remain as part of the jury 
panel. 
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Any alleged impropriety in the jury selection process was waived when 
Appellant's attorney failed to cure any alleged error by exercising his preemptory 
challenges on Jurors No. 1, 4, and 8, who were all part of the original jury panel. In State 
v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503 (1997), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the narrow legal 
question of whether a convicted criminal defendant is entitled to reversal on appeal when 
the trial court erroneously denied a for-cause challenge and the defendant failed to cure 
the error be exercising a peremptory challenge against the juror challenged for cause. 
After a comprehensive analysis, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We adopt the cure-or-waive rule and hold that in order to preserve the error on 
appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is 
available, against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause.... 935 P.2d at 510 
The trial court exercised proper discretion in seating the additional jurors on the 
prospective jury panel and in denying Appellant's challenges for cause. However, even 
if the court committed error in the jury selection process, Appellant failed to cure the 
error by using his preemptory challenges on the jurors challenged for cause. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT EITHER PROPERLY EXCLUDED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
ON ALCOHOL ABSORPTION/METABOLISM OR, IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN EXCLUDING SUCH TESTIMONY, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Mr. Levy's attorney represents on page 12 of his Brief that "Mr. Levy, is being 
tried under the amended statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (1999)." This statute 
provides: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
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(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within two 
hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the person has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; 
Assuming the foregoing statute is applicable, the Court properly disallowed expert 
testimony on the defendant's rate of alcohol absorption or metabolism to establish 
defendant's actual blood alcohol concentration at the time of arrest. Such a ruling is 
clearly consistent with the foregoing statute and does not invoke an "irrebuttable 
presumption" as alleged by Appellant. This statute makes it an "element of the crime" to 
have sufficient alcohol in a person's body that even though it may not be absorbed into 
the blood or brain at the time of driving, will within two hours of the time of driving 
bring the person's chemical test to show a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater. The statute is based on a reasonable and justifiable public policy 
consideration that a person should not be allowed to consume a quantity of alcohol and 
then drive hoping to get to their destination before the alcohol is absorbed and causes 
impairment. 
Appellant cites State v. Preece. 971 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1998) in support of his 
position that the Court should have allowed testimony regarding the absorptive and 
metabolic rates of alcohol. Preece construed the former statute which provided: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged 
operation or physical control; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (1999) was enacted to address the Preece 
decision. This is evidenced by the following language: 
l l 
Section 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) of the Utah Code 'prohibits driving or controlling a 
vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of .08 [grams] or more, not driving or 
controlling a vehicle when a test shows a level of .08 [grams] or more'. 971 P.2d 
at 7 
The arrest of Mr. Levy occurred on the evening of February 6, 1999 and the trial 
was held on August 11, 1999. The 1999 Amendment to 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) was not enacted 
at the time of the offense but was enacted at the time of trial. The record reveals the trial 
court and both counsel read from 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) as it existed before the 1999 
amendment. (Tr. 107, 108, 111, 112). 
The undersigned concedes that pursuant to State v. Preece, supra., the expert 
testimony on the absorption and metabolic rate of alcohol should have been admitted if 
the pre-1999 statute is applicable to the case at bar. However, Mr. Levy is charged in the 
alternative with either: (1) Driving while Under the Influence of Alcohol; or (2) Driving 
with Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration. Appellant's attorney specifically requested 
the jury to make a finding on whether Appellant was guilty of Driving While Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and Driving with an Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration. The 
supplemental transcript provides: 
MR. D'ELIA: Thank you, your Honor. The very first thing we're addressing at 
side bar conference to help bring about a (inaudible) verdict given. The verdict 
was given (inaudible), actually given is do you find the defendant either guilty of 
driving under the influence or with a blood alcohol content of .08 or greater, and 
the second one is not guilty of under the influence or .08 or greater. 
What I would ask the Court to do is, and I realize the Court will certainly - - has 
said it will take under consideration that we didn't make a record. I would ask the 
Court if in case this matter will need to be reviewed for some reason, that in fact 
we have the bifurcated jury form that the jury would then be able to select 
specifically whether they find the defendant guilty of being under the influence of 
alcohol, or .08 or greater, and make them individual so that the jury can mark off 
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which one of the affirmative counts, or both, that they necessarily found. I submit 
that as my complete argument, your Honor. (Supp. Tr. 2, Lines 13-25 through 
Supp. Tr. 3, Lines 1-8) 
The Court approved the foregoing request and it instructed the jury as follows: 
Ladies of the jury: The Court is back in session and defendant is present, counsel 
is present. There has been a request by counsel to do the following: If- - if you 
find the defendant guilty, there are two bases to do so, and counsel for the 
defendant has requested that with a pen you underline the provision in the verdict 
form that you find the defendant guilty of. It's in the alternative. "We the jurors 
in the above-entitled case find the defendant guilty of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and/or drugs." If you think that he was guilty of doing that, 
underline it, if you convict him. Or "we find the defendant guilty of driving with -
- or of driving with unsafe blood alcohol concentration." So if you find the 
defendant guilty, you can underline one or both, if that's the basis of your verdict; 
or if you find the defendant not guilty, don't even deal with it. (Supp. Tr. 8, Lines 
18-25 through Supp. Tr. 9, Lines 1-10) 
In the verdict form signed by the foreperson, the guilty verdict is checked and both 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Unsafe Blood Alcohol Concentration 
are underlined (R. 38). Because Appellant only provided a partial transcript of the trial 
court proceedings, this Court is unable to review the evidence supporting Mr. Levy's 
conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and therefore must presume 
said verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence. State v. Nine 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars. 791 P.2d 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 
1989); Horton v. Gem State Mut.. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Rawlings, 
829 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, if the pre-1999 statute is applicable 
any error in not allowing expert testimony is harmless. Harmless error was defined in 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) as follows: 
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Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. Put 
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high that it under mines our confidence in the verdict. Id. The burden 
of showing harmfulness normally rests with the complaining party. See Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987) (citing Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv., 
Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 & n. 12 (Utah 1974)); see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 448 (Utah 1988) (holding that 'appellant has the burden of establishing that 
reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion'). Robertson has failed to 
carry this burden. 932 P.2d at 1227. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the jury verdict finding Mr. Levy guilty of Driving 
While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Driving with Unsafe Blood Alcohol 
Concentration. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2000. 
Terry L. Christiansen 
Park City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Gerry D'Elia, D'ELIA & LEHMER, P.O. Box 626, Park 
City, Utah 84060, this 14th day of April, 2000. 
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